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Abstract
Strategic interactions between countries, such as arms races, alliances and
wider economic and political shocks, can induce strong cross-sectional depen-
dence in panel data models of military expenditure. If the assumption of
cross-sectional independence fails, standard panel estimators such as fixed or
random effects can lead to misleading inference. This paper shows how to
improve estimation of dynamic, heterogenous, panel models of the demand
for military expenditure allowing for cross-sectional dependence in errors us-
ing two approaches: Principal Components and Common Correlated Effect
estimators. Our results show that it is crucial to allow for cross-sectional de-
pendence, that the bulk of the effect is regional and there are large gains in fit
by allowing for both dynamics and between country heterogeneity in models
of the demand for military expenditures.
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1 Introduction
Strategic interactions between countries can induce cross-sectional dependence in
models of military expenditures estimated using panel data, for countries i =
1, 2, ..., N and time periods t = 1, 2, ..., T . These strategic interactions can arise for
a variety of reasons: arms races between hostile countries; burden sharing within
alliances; security-web interactions within regional networks; and economic and po-
litical shocks, like terrorist attacks, affecting the general perception of threat for all
units. The cross-sectional dependence appears as correlations between the errors in
different countries. This dependence may be local, interactions among neighbours
for instance; or global, unobserved common factors that drive the military expen-
ditures of all countries. If the unobserved strategic factors that cause the cross-
sectional dependence are correlated with regressors of interest, such as income, then
the estimated coefficients of those regressors will be biased and inconsistent.
While the importance of cross-sectional dependence has been widely recognised
in empirical arms race and alliance models, the issue has usually been addressed in
the context of quite restrictive models. For instance, one approach, used in Dunne
et al. (2008), relies on qualitative judgements about a country’s security-web to
allow the military expenditures of a country’s neighbours to be aggregated. This
requires identifying allies and enemies and choosing judgement-based weights in the
aggregation procedure. A second approach uses spatial econometric models, which
specify a distance or contiguity matrix to characterise the spillovers. A third ap-
proach, recently adopted in the panel literature, assumes that the cross-sectional
dependence can be characterised by a finite number of unobserved common factors
affecting all units with different intensities. This approach can be implemented em-
pirically if there exist proxies for the common factors. One way to obtain proxies is
by extracting cross-sectional commonalities in military expenditures using Principal
Component Analysis (PCA). PCA estimates the linear combinations of military ex-
penditures and factor loadings that account for most of the variation in the data. A
number of these linear combinations can be included in a demand model to control
for cross-sectional dependence. A second way to obtain proxies, known as Com-
mon Correlated Effect (Pesaran, 2006), consists of approximating the unobserved
common factor using cross-section averages of the dependent and independent vari-
ables. One advantage of the latter approach is that is easily implementable, it yields
consistent estimates under a variety of conditions – e.g. serial correlation in errors,
contemporaneous correlation between regressors and unobserved factors, spatial and
temporal correlations as shown by Coakley et al. (2006); Kapetanios et al. (2011);
Pesaran and Tosetti (2011)– and the estimates can be easily interpreted. However,
this approach requires panel data with both large N and large T .
SIPRI provides the most reliable and widely used series of military expenditures
data in academic research on defence economics, but until recently had the disad-
vantage that the time-series started in 1988. The recent release of the extended
SIPRI military expenditure data since 1945 enables the application of large T panel
techniques and the implementation of factor models that allow for cross-sectional
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dependence in errors. The US State Department World Military Expenditures and
Arm Trade, only provides 11 years of data.
In this paper, we use the SIPRI data to develop a dynamic model of the demand
for military expenditure where there is cross-sectional dependence between the er-
rors of different units due to unobserved common factors generated by strategic
interactions. This analysis develops the approach used in Cavatorta (2010) for the
MENA region and builds on recent panel time-series procedures surveyed by Chudik
and Pesaran (2015b) and given a text-book treatment in Pesaran (2015).
We discuss the estimation of dynamic, heterogeneous models of military expen-
ditures with cross-sectional dependence in errors using Principal Components (PCs)
and Common Correlated Effect (CCE) estimation procedures and compare the es-
timates with standard estimation techniques which ignore the issue. Unlike the
standard fixed effect approach, we allow for heterogeneity between countries, both
in regression coefficients and in the impact of the unobserved strategic factors. We
also examine differences between the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period
and between different regions. Our results show that it is crucial to allow for cross-
sectional dependence: doing so, whether by PCs or CCE methods, substantially
improves the fit. The bulk of the dependence appears to be within regions. The
results also show that it is crucial to allow for both dynamics and between country
heterogeneity, both of which improve the fit. Allowing for a structural break at the
end of the Cold War in the dynamic heterogeneous model seems less important.
Our conclusion is that it is important for researchers using the extended SIPRI
dataset to take account of dynamics, heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence
when choosing their specification. In particular, mean group estimation of error
correction models augmented by cross-section averages seems to provide an effective
modelling framework.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the data issues and provides
summary statistics. Section 3 sets out the basic theoretical framework of factor
models. Section 4 uses the PCs and CCE procedures to estimate static factor
models that attempt to determine the relative influence of economic and strategic
factors on the shares of military expenditure. Section 5 allows for dynamics both
in PCs and CCE models. Section 6 provides some conclusions and suggestions for
further research.
2 Data Issues
The SIPRI military expenditure series are the most widely used measures in aca-
demic research on military expenditures. They have the disadvantage that, up to
now, SIPRI has only provided consistent data from 1988. This is quite a short post
Cold War sample and researchers have tried to extend the data either by splicing to
earlier, unapproved, SIPRI series or to Correlates of War (COW) series, neither of
which are quite consistent with the later SIPRI authorised series. Brauner (2015)
discusses the combination of SIPRI and COW series. The availability of a database
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with a longer version of the authorised SIPRI series thus enables more interesting
explorations of the data.
SIPRI provides three series. Dit a domestic measure of military expenditure
in local currency at current prices; Mit real military expenditure in constant US
prices and exchange rates of a base year; and Sit = Mit/Yit the share of military
expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), also called military
burden. The GDP series that SIPRI uses to construct the share, Yit, is also available
in the database.
The focus of discussions of data quality is usually on the problems of measure-
ment of military expenditure and in their discussion of sources and methods. SIPRI
comment on the limitations of the data in terms of reliability, validity and com-
parability. However, it should be recognised that there are substantial revisions in
measured GDP and this is also a source of measurement error and data revisions.
We chose to use a balanced panel which gave a large T for a large set of N
countries. The 50 year period 1965-2014 with some interpolation, gave a sample
of 70 countries.1 There is a trade-off between obtaining the maximum T or N.
For explicit spatial models it is important that there are data for neighbours, thus
increasing N at the expense of T is sensible. We are interested in the dynamic
heterogeneous models so increasing T at the expense of N has advantages. This is
not a random selection of countries. Having data for the whole of the period 1965-
2014 excludes important countries such as China, which has a lot of missing data
on military expenditure, and the Soviet Union and the 15 Soviet successor states
including Russia.
We give summary statistics, for military expenditure, GDP and the share of
military expenditure for the full sample and for the balanced panel in Table 1.
In terms of the share of military expenditure the full and balanced samples
were very similar: means of 2.96% in the full sample and 2.89% in the balanced
sample. The full sample, with a standard deviation of 3.5%, was more dispersed
than the balanced sample, with a standard deviation of 2.9. In the balanced sample
80% of the variance came from the between-country cross-section dimension. Both
distributions are highly skewed. While there is a minimum of zero to the left, there
is no maximum to the right, military expenditure can be over 100% of GDP. The
maximum in the full sample was 117%, Kuwait, in the balanced sample 30%. The
distributions of military expenditure and GDP are also skewed. Military expenditure
in the full sample, is about 60% of the balanced sample. However, GDP in the full
sample is twice that of the balanced sample. Notice that the mean of the ratios of
military expenditure to GDP is not the same as the ratio of the means.
1The countries are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burkino Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finalnd, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatamala, Honduras, India,
Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea South, Liberia, Libya, Luxemburg, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myamar, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Norway Pakistan Paraguay Peru Phillipines Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Spain Sri Lanka, Sweden Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, USA
Venuezela Zimbabwe.
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The bottom panel of Table 1 gives summary statistics for the shares of military
expenditure for the five regions. Four of the regions, Africa, Americas, Asia, and
Europe, have very similar mean shares of military expenditure between 2-3%, the
Middle East is much higher at 8.7%.
3 Modelling Framework
3.1 Strategic Interactions
The classic quantitative representation of the determination of military expenditures
is the Richardson Arms Race Model. This describes the dynamic interaction of
military expenditures of countries 1 and 2, m1(t), m2(t). There is a positive stimulus
from the rival and negative fatigue effects from one’s own spending:
dm1(t)
dt
= a1 + b1m2(t)− c1m1(t),
dm2(t)
dt
= a2 + b2m1(t)− c2m2(t).
This implies dependence between the military expenditures of the different coun-
tries. This model has been widely applied, with relatively limited success, partly
because interactions are rarely that mechanical or purely bilateral. Even in classic
arms races, like those between Greece and Turkey or India and Pakistan, the actors
are responding to other threats than from their antagonist; the Soviet Union in
the case of Greece and Turkey and China in the case of India and Pakistan. The
expenditures of possible allies would also matter, like the US in the case of Greece
and Turkey. There is also a budget constraint limiting expenditures.
The model that we use to provide a framework, which is very standard in the
literature, generalises the Richardson model and is reviewed in Dunne and Smith
(2007). It assumes that military expenditures are determined by both economic and
strategic factors. The economic factors are typically measured by GDP to approx-
imate the budget constraint and the strategic factors are usually measured by the
military expenditures of other countries, allies or potential enemies, which represent
the threat or fear factor. Although we will also estimate a dynamic model, to clarify
the exposition we start from a simple static model determining mit, the logarithm
of real military expenditures of country i = 1, 2, ..., N in year t = 1, 2, ..., T , by the
logarithm of their real GDP, yit, and other countries military expenditures, mjt, for
j 6= i,. Then the model can be written as a system of N equations of the form:
mit = αi + ηiyit +
∑
j 6=i
γijmjt + uit. (1)
The income elasticity of demand for military expenditure is ηi, the feedback from
other countries military expenditures is given by γij. Smith (1995) discusses how
equations of this sort can be derived from optimising a social welfare function,
which depends on security and consumption, subject to a budget constraint. Other
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variables could be added such as indicators of political regime as in Brauner (2015);
indicators of internal or external conflict as in Dunne et al. (2008) or other sources of
income, such as aid, as in Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007). But given our focus is on cross-
sectional dependence we will just use a simple model relating military expenditures
to GDP.
Clearly it is not possible to freely estimate the N − 1 feedback coefficients.2
Various ways to deal with this curse of dimensionality have been adopted in the
literature. Spatial models for the N × 1 vector of dependent variables, military
expenditures in our case, y, determined by a N ×K matrix of covariates, X, allow
spillovers mediated through a known N × N non-negative weight matrix W, with
zeros on the diagonal. This could represent distance between the units, whether
the units share a common border, or some other measure of closeness. The general
nesting spatial econometric model is:
y = Xβ0+WXβ1 + γWy + e
e = ρWe
There are endogeneity problem in cases where either of the scalars γ or ρ are not
equal to zero and other estimators than OLS are available in the literature. If W
is known this reduces the curse of dimensionality, but it may not be known. More
importantly for our purposes, the term of most interest is the spatial autoregressive
term, γWy, which captures the influence of other countries military expenditures
on the expenditures of the focus country. But this only has a single parameter γ
which cannot capture the different signs of the interactions with allies and enemies.
In (1) , one might expect that for enemies γij > 0, reflecting arms races; for
allies γij < 0, since their military expenditures can substitute for yours; and for
uninvolved pairs γij = 0. In the literature on alliances, surveyed in Murdoch (1995),
considerable attention is paid to the technology by which the military expenditures
of allies is aggregated. This imposes a particular structure on the γij. The technology
may make the strength of the alliance depend on the simple sum, the best shot or
the weakest link. Another common procedure to reduce the curse of dimensionality
is to use ad-hoc weights to sum the military expenditures of potential allies to give a
measure of friends spending and sum that of potential adversaries to give a measure
of foes spending. These ad-hoc weights can be based on qualitative judgements
about the security web, the nature of the linkages with the other countries, as in
Dunne et al. (2008).
3.2 Principal Component Approach
If a set of allies are all responding to a common threat, they are likely to all move
their military expenditures together generating a positive correlation between them
as well as between them and their potential enemies. Such positive correlations
2If the dependence was on own and others lagged military expenditure, (1) would correspond
to the infinite VAR discussed by Chudik and Pesaran (2011).
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between allies are common in the literature. This positive correlation among all the
military expenditures of a group of interacting nations can be represented by a com-
mon unobserved threat factor driving the military expenditures of the interacting
countries. Among a large group of countries, there are likely to be more than one
strategic interaction, so the military expenditures may be driven by more than one
threat factor. Assume that there are K such interactions with K such unobserved
latent factors, f ∗kt, k = 1, 2, .., K . Then we can write the model as
mit = αi + ηiyit +
K∑
k=1
λikf
∗
kt + eit (2)
Where the weights λik are non-zero if country i is involved in interaction k. The fkt
can be estimated by the method of principal components, PCs, as linear combina-
tions of the military expenditures:
f ∗kt =
N∑
j=1
akjmjt k = 1, 2, .., K (3)
and one might hope that a few PCs would account for a lot of the variation in military
expenditures. One would expect K to be much smaller than N , so estimating (2)
will be much easier than estimating (1) . One can recover the coefficients on other
countries military expenditure as
γij = λikakj.
If we define the logarithm of the share of military expenditure in GDP as sit =
mit − yit, then we can write the model in log shares as
sit = αi + βiyit +
K∑
k=1
λikfkt + eit (4)
where βi = ηi − 1. If the income elasticity of demand for military expenditures is
unity, as is often assumed, βi = 0 and log GDP drops out of the equations. Shares
may also be a better indicator of threat perceptions than military expenditures, not
being dominated by size. So one could estimate the factors as the PCs of the shares
of military expenditure:
fkt =
N∑
i=1
akisit k = 1, 2, .., K. (5)
Estimating the factors using (5) rather than (3) implies that the threat from
enemies or support from allies is represented not by the level of their military expen-
ditures but by their share of military expenditure in GDP, perhaps as an indication
of commitment or intent. This is not implausible given the importance attached by
NATO to the commitment made at the 2014 Cardiff summit to spend at least 2%
of GDP on defence. The fit of the shares model can be compared with the levels
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model using some model selection criterion like the BIC,3 which can be used even
though the models are not nested. To nest model (4) in model (2) , one would need
to add the log GDP of the other countries to (2).
The strategic factors may not be global but regional so the model could be
applied not over all countries N, but over the number of countries in the region
Nr, for r = 1, 2, ...R. One could also allow for the US being a dominant unit, as
discussed in Chudik and Pesaran (2013) that appears as an explanatory variable
in every region. The Principal Components allow us to measure how much of the
variance of the shares or military expenditure is accounted for by these strategic
factors and how they influence each country.
Model (4) is heterogeneous, the coefficients differ across countries and we can
report the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) reporting the average
and standard error of the coefficients. A special case of model (4) is the two way
fixed effect model, which imposes slope homogeneity, βi = β, and the factors having
the same effect on each country
∑K
k=1 λikfkt = αt. The model is then:
sit = αi + αt + βyit + eit (6)
A different model which is intermediate between the mean group and two way fixed
effects is the interactive fixed effects model of Bai (2009), which assumes slope
homogeneity (βi = β) but allows the effect of the factors to differ over countries.
Model (4) is a very parsimonious model. Clearly, there are many other variables
that one might think are omitted from the model. These might include measures of
conflict and quality of the institutions in the country, and many other economic and
political variables. Using a parsimonious model has the advantage that we can use
the maximum number of observations for which we have SIPRI military share data,
not losing data because of missing observations on other variables. It also allows
us to focus on the role of cross-sectional dependence in a simple case. Denote these
omitted variables by the vector zit, so that the correct model is
sit = α
∗
i + β
∗
i yit +
K∑
k=1
λ∗ikfkt + φ
′
izit + eit.
Notice that β∗i is measuring a different parameter of interest from βi. The parameter
β∗i measures the effect of a change in income holding zit constant, while βi measures
the effect of a change in income allowing zit to adjust as it does in the sample. The
effect of this omission depends on the correlation between income, the global factors,
fkt, and the country specific omitted variables zit. Consider the case of democracy.
Democracy seems a relevant variable since democracies spend less than autocracies
on the military and are richer. If the country is a democracy throughout the period,
zit = zi, as it does not vary over time. The effect of any time invariant variable is
picked up by the intercept αi. After the Cold War many country undertook a process
of democratisation. This time-varying factor will be correlated across countries and
3The BIC seems more appropriate than the AIC because it is more parsimonious and with large
data sets it is easy for parameters to proliferate.
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hence with the global factors, which pick up the reduction in the share of military
expenditure during the democratisation process. In sum, to the extent that the
country specific variables zit are correlated with GDP or the factors, these variables
will pick up the effects of the zit and may be a parsimonious representation of many
influences that lack consistent data across the sample. If, however, there are time-
varying unobserved country specific variables that vary in a way that is uncorrelated
with income or the factors, then this will increase the unexplained variance. How
big an improvement in fit results from including these possible omitted variables is
a subject for future research.
3.3 Common Correlated Effect Approach
Above we assumed that the unobserved factors were estimated by principal compo-
nents, but they can also be allowed for using the correlated common effect, CCE,
estimator. Reparameterise (2) in terms of shares, so βi = ηi − 1, and for exposition
initially assume that there is only a single threat factor, though in estimation we
allow for a multi-factor model (e.g. there there may be separate factors for enemies
and allies). Then
sit = αi + βiyit + λift + eit. (7)
Average (7) over the countries to give
st = α + βyt + λft + et + ηt (8)
where
st =
∑N
i=1 sit/N, λ =
∑N
i=1 λi/N, et =
∑N
i=1 eit/N,
β =
∑N
i=1 βi/N, yt =
∑N
i=1 yit/N, ηt =
∑N
i=1
(
βi − β
)
yit/N.
Assuming λ 6= 0, we can write (8) as
ft = λ
−1 (
st − α− βyt − et − ηt
)
thus we can approximately filter out the effect of the factor by including st and yt
in (7) instead of the factor
sit = αi + βiyit + λi
[
λ
−1 (
st − α− βyt − et − ηt
)]
+ eit
sit = ai + βiyit + δ1ist + δ2iyt + uit (9)
where
uit = λiλ
−1
(−et − ηt) + eit,
ai = αi − λiλ−1α.
Pesaran (2006) provides more details and the generalisation to the dynamic
case, which we use below, is provided in Chudik and Pesaran (2015a). Note that
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the covariance of st with uit declines with N, so for N large we can treat st as
exogenous.
We can compare (7) , using two factors, estimating the ft by the principal com-
ponents of the shares, with (9) and see which fits better. If we use two PCs both
the CCE and PC equations will have the same degrees of freedom, so their fit is
directly comparable.
Both (7) and (9) assume heterogeneous relationships, different for every country.
We could also see whether there is any evidence of homogeneity by comparing the
fit of the heterogeneous models with the fit of the two way fixed effect model (6) ,
above which imposes slope homogeneity βi = β and that the factor has the same
effect everywhere so λift = λft = αt.
3.4 Testing for error cross section dependence
This section is based on Pesaran (2015) section 29.7, which considers the issues in
more depth. The tests for error correlation use the estimated correlations between
the equation residuals:
ρˆij =
T∑
t=1
uˆituˆjt/
(
T∑
t=1
uˆ2it
)1/2 ( T∑
t=1
uˆ2jt
)1/2
.
Under the null of no cross-sectional dependence for finite N and large T,
√
T ρ̂ij ∼
N(0, 1) and T ρ̂2ij is χ
2
1.
The Breusch-Pagan LM test is for the hypothesis H0 : ρij = 0, all i 6= j, and uses
the N(N − 1)/2 squared correlations, ρ̂2ij. This test tends to be highly over-sized,
rejecting too often, when N is large, as in our case with N = 70. The hypothesis,
ρij = 0, for all i 6= j, is sensible when N is small and fixed as T →∞. However, when
N is large, requiring all correlations, 2415 in our case, to be zero is overly restrictive.
A few non-zero correlations are not going to adversely affect the properties of the
regression parameters of interest. In addition, unless T is very large, coincident
outliers in pairs of countries can generate high correlations.
To avoid the problem that the LM test is not correctly centred, Pesaran (2004)
proposed a cross-sectional dependence test (CSDPesaran) based on the average cor-
relations, which has mean zero for fixed values of N and T. This is the test that we
shall use and is given by:
CSDPesaran =
√
2T
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρ̂ij
 ∼ N(0, 1).
The implicit null hypothesis of this test is weak cross-sectional dependence. How-
ever, even this test is likely to over-reject in the case of models with weakly exogenous
regressors if N is much larger than T , e.g. lagged dependent variables. Because this
test is based on the average correlation, positive and negative correlations cancel
out. We also report the average absolute correlation to take this into account.
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4 Estimation of Static Factor Models
4.1 Estimation of the Common Factors (PCA)
We begin by estimating the common factors as the principal components, PCs,
of the shares of military expenditure, the logarithms of military expenditures, the
logarithms of GDP and the logarithms of the shares for the 70 countries in our
balanced panel over the whole period, 1965-2014; for the two sub-periods 1965-88
and 1989-2014; and for the five regions. The cumulative share of the variance of
military burden explained by the first 5 Principal Components is given in Table 2
for each case.
For all countries and the whole period, the first PC explains 50% of the variance
of the share, the second 17% and the third 7%, so the first three explain 74% of the
variance and the first 5, 82%. Clearly, there are strong common factors that drive
these series. In the Cold War the first PC explains less of the variation than in the
post Cold War periods, though the total explained by the first 5 is similar. The
strength of the common factors differ across regions. For Africa and the Americas,
the first PC explains a much smaller part of the variance than it does in the other
regions and the second a larger part relative to the other regions. The first PC
explains 37% in Africa and 43% in the Americas, compared to 60% or more in the
other regions. It seems plausible that more idiosyncratic factors drive the shares of
military expenditures in Africa and the Americas. Notice that the shares are not
weighted, so in the measured variance of the shares in the Americas, the US gets
equal weight to any other country. Because of this, including the US in the other
regions did not change the results very much, since it has a small weight. In Asia,
Europe and the Middle East the first PC explains a larger proportion of the variance
than in the full sample, in Europe a striking 79% of the variance is explained by
the first PC. Europe was in the front line of the Cold War and it is plausible that
European shares of military expenditure were driven largely by the Cold War factor.
For all the countries and the whole period, the first PC is plotted against the
second PC in Figure 1. The bulk of the observations lie in a vertical column, with
a value for PC1 of just over 0.1. This roughly corresponds to the mean share,
giving an an equal positive weight to most countries. There are a group of countries
that have negative values for PC1, these are Algeria, Burundi, Colombia, Congo,
Ecuador, Japan, Liberia, Sierra, Leone, Sri Lanka. Libya, Mexico and Uganda have
very small positive values. All these countries except Japan and, perhaps, Mexico
have seen substantial civil wars. It is interesting that this PCA procedure identifies
these as outliers even though it was not designed to do so. There is also a pattern
for countries in the main group with a high or low value for PC2, to have a value of
PC1 closer to zero, introducing some curvature.
When one looks at it by sub-period, the post-Cold War period figure looks very
similar to Figure 1, with most countries having a positive weighting. However, for
the Cold War period the pattern is very different. Figure 2 shows a large block of
countries having a positive weighting, and a large block having a negative weighting.
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The curvature apparent in Figure 1 is now apparent in both blocks. It looks almost
like a circle.
Figure 3 plots PC1 and PC2. PC1 is roughly constant till about 1985 and then
trends steadily downwards. It reflects the high shares of the cold war, then the
downward trend. PC2 trends upwards to the early 1980s then trends downwards.
It is not so clear what the interpretation of PC2 is. This is a limitation of PCs, it
is often difficult to interpet them.
Table 3 gives the proportion explained by the first five PCs for the log share, the
log of military spending and the log of GDP. The proportions explained were higher
for the log of share than share, the first PC explaining 55% of log share as compared
to 50% of share. Not surprisingly the common factors in log military expenditure
and log GDP are much higher than for log shares because the level variables have
more variance, and log GDP has a strong trend. For log GDP the first PC explains
95% of the variance. Clearly a much stronger factor drives GDP than the shares of
military expenditure.
4.2 CCE and PC static model estimates
We report the Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean group estimates for these models.
Estimates are given for the full sample, two sub-periods 1965-88 and 1989-2014 and
for the five regional groupings. The tables give the Wald test for the hypothesis
that the means of the three slope coefficients are zero. It is a test on the averages
of the coefficients. The Sum LL is the sum of the maximised log likelihood over the
individual regressions for the N countries. It is not the log likelihood for the system,
since it ignores the covariances. For model selection, we also use an approximate
Bayesian information criterion BIC =
∑N
i=1 LLi− 0.5K lnNT, where K is the total
number of prameters estimated. This is approximate both because the Sum LL
ignores the covariances and because it is not clear that N and T should be treated
symmetrically. The literature on model selection in panel data is relatively small.
The notes to the tables also give the CSDPesaran test statistic.
The mean group estimates using PCs MG-PC are given in Table 4, together
with the estimates with no factors in the bottom panel. Adding the factors clearly
improves the fit and changes the estimate of the coefficient of GDP. It also reduces
cross-sectional dependence the CSDPesaran test statistic, which is N(0, 1) under the
null of no correlation, falls from 62.5 to 0.405 when the PCs are added. There is clear
evidence of a structural break. Splitting the data into two sub-periods improves the
fit substantially, increasing the log-likelihood for the model including PCs from 1980
to 3301. The pattern of coefficients is quite different in the whole period, where log
GDP is insignificant and the two factors significant, and the two sub-periods, where
GDP is significant and, with the exception of the first factor in the pre-Cold War
period, the factors are not significant on average. Notice that while the average
of the coefficients of the factors may not be significant, they may be significant in
individual countries: some responding positively and some negatively to the factors.
Although the coefficients of GDP are significant in the sub-periods they are not
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large, indicating that the common assumption that the income elasticity of demand
for military expenditure is close to one, is not unreasonable. Disaggregation by
regions has a much smaller effect, raising the LL from 1980 to 2138. In the regions,
the first factor is significant and positive, but the second factor is insignificant.
The mean group estimates using cross-section means MG-CCE are given in Table
5. Including the means reduces the CSDPesaran test statistic from 62.5 to 5.8, but
not by as much as the PCs. As with the PC estimates, splitting the sample into
sub-periods improves the fit substantially increasing LL from 1757 to 3023. It is also
clear that including two PCs works better than including the means of the share and
log GDP. As in the PC case, the coefficient of log GDP is insignificant in the whole
period but significant in the two sub-periods. Whereas the pattern of GDP only
being significant when the sample is split into two sub-periods is the same in the
PC and CCE cases, the size of the coefficient are not. The CCE estimates suggest
that military expenditure is very inelastic, with an elasticity of 0.49 in the first
period compared with the PC estimate of 0.79. In the second period the difference
is smaller, with the CCE estimate of 0.77 and the PC of 0.86. The fact that the
coefficient of GDP is larger in the CCE estimator suggests that it is a countries GDP
relative to the world average that matters. In all cases the mean of the coefficients
of log GDP, β¯ = N−1
∑
βi is of opposite sign to the mean of the coefficients of GDP
average, δ¯2 = N
−1∑ δ1i. In the two sub-periods when β¯, the coefficient of log GDP,
is significant that on average GDP, δ¯2, is also significant. The PC estimate based
on the shares cannot capture this relative feature whereas the CCE estimator does.
It is also noticeable that in almost all the cases the mean of the coefficients of the
mean share, δ¯1 = N
−1∑ δ1i from (9) is close to one and is very significant. In the
two way fixed effect estimator the coefficient of the mean of the dependent variable,
δ1, would be one and the coefficient on the mean of the independent variable, δ2
would be equal and opposite the coefficient of the independent variable, since (6)
can be written as
sit − s¯t = αi + β(yit − y¯t) + εit.
Figure 4 plots the histogram of the coefficients of income for both procedures,
PCA and CCE. The CCE estimates seem more dispersed, though in both cases
the range is quite wide (income elasticities between -0.5 and almost 2): there is
clearly considerable heterogeneity in the income coefficients. Figure 5 plots the
scatter diagram between the two sets of income coefficients. There is a positive
though not very strong relationship, the fitted regression line being dominated by
an outlier, where both estimates are close to -1.5. The average income coefficients
differ between the two methods, primarily because of the high variance of the CCE
estimates.
Table 6 shows the fit statistics for the 10 models. Allowing for heterogeneity,
cross-section dependence and a break at the end of the Cold War all improve the fit.
The approximate BIC would choose the MG-PC split into sub-samples as the best
model and an AIC calculated in the same way would also choose this. However,
these are all static models and in time-series dynamics are likely to be important.
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In addition, the variables may be I(1) and possibly cointegrated.4
5 Dynamic Factor Models
5.1 PCs and CCE dynamic models
We now present the dynamic models. The dynamic CCE equation is:
sit = α0i + α1isi,t−1 + β0iyit + β1iyi,t−1 + δ10,ist + δ11,ist−1 (10)
+δ20,iyt + δ21,iyt−1 + uit.
This can also be written in error correction form
∆sit = a0i + a1isi,t−1 + b0i∆yit + b1iyi,t−1 + d10,i∆st + d11,ist−1 (11)
+d20,i∆yt + d21,iyt−1 + uit.
The error correction form is useful to capture both long and short-term dynamics
in a single model. The dynamic PCs model specifications are similar, substituting
∆f¯1 for ∆st and f¯1 for st−1 and ∆f¯2 for ∆yt and f¯2 for yt−1. The number of
estimated parameters remains the same, so the PC and CCE models are directly
comparable using log-likelihoods.
5.2 PCs and CCE dynamic estimates
The mean-group estimates of the dynamic model (11) are reported in Table 7.
Adding dynamics substantially improves the fit, increasing the BIC considerably,
the best static model has a BIC of 994, the best dynamic model, MG, has a BIC
of 1834. Table 8 presents the fit statistics for the ten dynamic models models.
Unlike in the static case, neither splitting the sample or allowing for cross-sectional
dependence improves the fit according to the BIC. However, on the basis of the
CSDPesaran statistics, including the world means reduces cross-sectional dependence
considerably. The dynamic MG with no correction for cross-section dependence has
a CSD statistic of 18.31, with an average correlation of 0.053 and an average absolute
correlation of 0.126. The MG-CCE which includes means has a CSD statistic of -
2.12, average correlation of -0.006 and an average absolute correlation of 0.126, so
reducing the extent of cross-sectional dependence as one might expect. Unlike the
static case the one way fixed effect has a BIC that is similar to MG-CCE. Moving
to two way fixed effect does not improve the BIC, indicating that allowing for a
common factor does not improve fit in the homogeneous model.
Based on the log-likelihood or BIC, the model using PCs performs slightly better
than the model using CCE, but the difference is small. However, the magnitude of
the factors’ coefficients are difficult to interpret in the PC case as they do not
4Breitung and Pesaran (2008) discuss unit roots and cointegration in panels. Kapetanios et al.
(2011) discuss panels with non-stationary multifactor error structures.
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have clear-cut units of measurement, whereas the coefficients of the mean have a
straightforward interpretation. In the CCE models, the mean group estimate of the
long-run effect of a common increase in the level of threat, represented by the global
average share of military expenditure, can be calculated as −d¯11/a¯1. In this case, the
two coefficients have the same units, in PCs models the two coefficients have different
units. We show the heterogeneity of long-run effects of military expenditures to
common threat estimated using CCE in Figure 6. The distribution of long-run
effects using PCs model is almost uniformly centered at zero because the estimated
coefficient of the first factor, d11, is almost zero in any country. The US is an extreme
outlier because the coefficient a1i is almost zero making the ratio very large. The
heterogeneous estimator, on which the mean-group estimates are based, also perform
much better than the fixed effect, FE, estimator which imposes homogeneity. Thus
we do not report the FE results. The coefficient on s¯t−1 in the FE model (0.0965)
and that of the mean-group estimator (0.206) are different, suggesting that country
heterogeneity is important.
Splitting the CCE model by pre- and post-1988 period does not improve the fit
as measured by the BIC. This is because there is a trade-off between fit and number
of estimated parameters. The time-series for the sub-periods are quite short and
the increase in estimated parameters imposes a large penalty on the BIC. There is a
small T downward bias in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and it is
noticeable that in both sub-periods the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
is more negative than in the whole period. The long-run effect of the world share,
possibly a measure of the effect of common threats, is slightly larger in the Cold
War period than in the post Cold War period. This suggests that using a simple
Cold War dummy variable for pre- and post-1988 is not sufficient to capture that
variation. In addition, there is little correlation between the estimated coefficient
on yt−1 in the Cold War and post-Cold War period (these correlations are -0.09 and
0.03 using the CCE and PCs models, respectively.
5.3 Disaggregating the factors
Up to now we have assumed a single global factor, now we want to allow for separate
influences from global and regional factors and the impact of the US, as a dominant
unit. We keep world GDP since a global economic cycle is plausible and the PCA
analysis above indicated that the first factor accounted for the bulk of the variation
in GDP. The results are shown in Table 9 where in addition to the change and lagged
level or the world share, the change and lagged level of the regional and US share are
included, where the region is the geographical region of country i defined by SIPRI
(i.e., Africa, Americas, Asia & Oceania, Europe and Middle East). The world share
and US shares are not significant but both the change and lag in the regional shares
are very significant: regional factors seem to be important. The pattern seems to be
very similar across the two sub-periods, with the exception of the greater downward
bias on the lagged dependent variable as a result of the reduction in T . The short-
run effects of regional shares are almost identical to that for the whole period at
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0.85, the long-run effects are also very similar 0.92 for the whole period, 0.87 for
the Cold War and 0.95 for the post Cold War. These coefficients are slightly larger
than the long-run effect of the world share in Table 7, which was 0.6.
The growth rate and lagged level of both own and world log GDP are significant.
The coefficients of lagged own and lagged world GDP are roughly equal and opposite,
which suggests that it may be own GDP relative to the world average which has a
positive effect. The coefficients are small so the long-run income elasticity is close
to unity, as one would expect. The short-run effect of GDP growth is negative: this
may be because military expenditure adjusts slowly, so transitory increases in the
growth rate are associated with a falling share, as military expenditure does not
keep up.
There is still some cross-section dependence, the CSD test statistics is -3.33
with an average correlation of -0.010 and an average absolute correlation of 0.131.
Examining the individual correlations suggests that they are random rather than re-
flecting omitted strategic interactions. The three largest correlations are: Mauritius-
New Zealand (+0.567), Thailand-Bolivia(-0.565), Turkey-Saudi Arabia, (-0.525) and
none of the top ten seemed sensible and the correlations may reflect coincidence of
outliers.5 Cases where one might expect arms races showed low correlations: Greece-
Turkey -0.291 and India-Pakistan 0.142.
Since the world shares and the US shares were not individually significant, they
were dropped and only the change and lagged levels of regional shares and world
GDP were retained. The results are in Table 9. The reduction in the log-llikelihood
from 3854 to 3534 in the whole period model is very small given that we are saving
4 × 69 parameters. The CSD results are very similar and, as before, splitting into
sub-periods does not improve the fit. The effect of regional shares is slightly smaller,
but apart from that, removing world and US shares has not changed the results very
much.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a model of the demand for military expenditure where
there is cross-sectional dependence in the errors due to unobserved common factors
generated by strategic interactions. If such omitted factors are correlated with the
regressors, as they well may be, they will cause the coefficients of those regressors to
be biased. The procedures to allow for cross-section dependence, which we describe
in detail, are relatively straightforward to implement: add cross-section means or
principal components. Either cross-section means or principal components are sig-
nificant and reduce the degree of cross-section dependence. These are acting as
proxies for the unobserved factors causing the cross-section dependence. Clearly
there are strong strategic factors driving the shares of military expenditure, so it is
5The other seven were Portugal-Burkina Faso; Burkina Faso-Austria; Pakistan-Japan; Belgium-
Austria; Colombia-Mali; Colombia-Paraguay; Libya-Malaysia; all with correlations between 0.5
and 0.45.
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important that one allows for these factors. These factors seem to be region specific,
rather than global and the US does not seem to be acting as a dominant unit. There
is also evidence of substantial heterogeneity across countries, so that assuming slope
homogeneity as it is done in fixed effect models may be misleading. There is little
evidence of a significant structural break at the end of the Cold War.
There are a range of natural extensions. Firstly, to emphasise the role of cross-
section dependence and to obtain the largest possible sample, we have used a very
simple model with income as the only independent variable. There are many other
economic and political measures that have been used to explain military expen-
ditures in the literature and their role could be investigated. Secondly, we have
assumed that income is exogenous despite the fact that there is a large literature
investigating the effect of military expenditure on growth. This issue could be in-
vestigated by estimating a VAR in military expenditures and GDP and testing for
the pattern of Granger causality. Thirdly, our results show that there is consider-
able heterogeneity and there is scope to examine the factors that determine that
heterogeneity: are there characteristics of the countries that explain the differences
in coefficients? This could be linked to case studies of the individual countries. The
extended SIPRI data set opens up the possibility of a large range of quantitative
and qualitative studies.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N group Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Entire panel (1965-2014)
burden 172 6,420 0.029608 0.035163 0 1.173498
milex (billion) 172 6,372 9.108008 45.84714 0 720.2188
GDP (billion) 172 8,600 32652.5 511791.7 0 2.72E+07
Balanced panel
burden 70 3,500 0.028917 0.029275 0.001399 0.304638
milex (billion) 70 3,412 14.75106 60.63815 0.001655 720.2188
GDP (billion) 70 3,500 15802.79 92983.97 1.55E-11 150286
Military burden by region
Africa 19 950 0.023637 0.022778 0.001399 0.267347
Americas 16 800 0.020704 0.013485 0.003482 0.090634
Asia 11 550 0.027417 0.015566 0.005447 0.069917
Europe 17 850 0.022885 0.011169 0.004746 0.059623
Middle East 6 300 0.087121 0.057432 0.015873 0.304638
Table 2: Cumulative Proportions of Military Burden explained by Principal Com-
ponents
All Cold War period Post-Cold War Africa Americas Asia Europe Mid East
N 72 72 72 20 16 11 17 7
T 65-14 65-88 89-14 65-14 65-14 65-14 65-14 65-14
PC1 0.4982 0.4195 0.5711 0.374 0.4293 0.6654 0.7929 0.5961
PC2 0.672 0.5976 0.7068 0.6008 0.6414 0.783 0.8827 0.8021
PC3 0.7397 0.7323 0.7993 0.6854 0.7479 0.8475 0.9389 0.8963
PC4 0.7899 0.7928 0.8432 0.7531 0.8134 0.8974 0.9569 0.9518
PC5 0.8241 0.8398 0.8659 0.8102 0.863 0.9282 0.9711 0.9776
Table 3: Cumulative Proportions of (log) Military Burden/Expenditure/GDP ex-
plained by Principal Components
log(burden) log(milex) log(GDP)
N 70
T 1965-2014
PC1 0.548 0.6141 0.9491
PC2 0.7146 0.7782 0.9717
PC3 0.7775 0.849 0.9913
PC4 0.8263 0.8897 0.995
PC5 0.861 0.9206 0.9972
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Figure 1: Principal Components (balanced panel, 1965-2014)
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Figure 2: Principal Components pre-Cold War period (balanced panel, 1965-1988)
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Table 6: Goodness-of-fit statistics for static models, entire period
and sub-periods
MG-CCE MG-PC MG FE2 FE1
Estimation for the entire period
SumLL 1755 1907 277 -1379 -1707
NT 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
k 280 280 140 119 71
BIC 615 767 -293 -1863 -1996
Estimation by sub-period
SumLL 3017 3273 1942 -613 -766
NT 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
k 560 560 280 189 142
BIC 738 994 802 -1382 -1343
Table 8: Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models, entire period
and sub-periods
MG-CCE MG-PC MG FE2 FE1
Estimation for the entire period
MLL 3511 3576 2974 1606 1535
NT 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
k 560 560 280 121 73
BIC 1232 1297 1834 1114 1238
Estimation by sub-period
MLL 4492 4458 3631 1690 1642
NT 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
k 1120 1120 560 193 146
BIC -67 -100 1352 904 1048
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Figure 6: Histogram of log-run burden effect
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